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It was not me who coined the term “ narrative 
bioethics.” I discovered the term in the title 
of a dissertation, written by a young theo-
logian, Katrin Bentele, which dealt with 
ethical dilemmas in doing research on 
Parkinson (Bentele, 2007). She concluded 
her dissertation with a quotation out of my 
book, which has the title, in English, “Deep 
in the brain” (Dubiel, 2009). This book, 
in which I described my experience with 
living with Parkinson and with deep brain 
stimulation, turned out to be – compared 
to the books I had published previously – a 
real bestseller.
What struck me in particular was that, 
from the moment of its appearance, this 
slim book of mine was praised as a decisive 
contribution in the field of narrative bioeth-
ics. The above mentioned Katrin Bentele 
went so far to quote 10 pages out of my 
book, calling it social scientific discipline 
“avant la lettre.”
The first question I want to raise is how 
the ethical, political, and cultural implica-
tions and consequences of the new high-risk 
technologies differ from other technologies 
of the past century, like nuclear energy or 
nano-technology. To my impression, no 
other technology has raised even prior to 
its final implementation a comparable mix 
of apocalyptic anxieties and chiliastic hopes.
Bioethicians are not motivated – like 
many of their critics seem to suppose – by 
a naive form of technophobia, inspired by 
irrational ideologies. Nor do they indulge 
in a blind appraisal for anything that is 
technically new, irrespective of the pur-
poses it serves. The ethical evaluation of 
a new surgery technique, a new pill or a 
new treatment usually starts with general 
principles or norms, which are sharpened 
(or specified) in a dialectical interplay 
with individual case studies. Thus they 
pretend to arrive at bioethical positions, 
which are “thick” and “thin” at the same 
time. They are “thick” in the sense of hav-
ing absorbed a lot of empirical context–
knowledge; they are “thin” in the sense of 
having been inspired by the most abstract 
set of cognitive and ethical principles. 
Some bioethicians are convinced to have 
discovered a scheme of judgment, which is 
no longer affected or distorted by empirical 
contingencies or too high levels of theo-
retical abstraction. This kind of (over-) 
generalized principles are also called the 
“the first order principles,” such as truth-
fulness, justice, fairness, universability 
(Kant’s “Categorical Imperative”), “divine-
command.” These “first order principles” 
will soon prove to be too abstract for con-
structing the foundations of an applied 
ethics like bioethics. In this case you have 
to construe an elaborated set of “second 
order principles.” Examples for “second 
order principles” taken out of the context 
of bioethics are:
– Respect for the self determination of 
people affected by a disease which is 
or will be curable or at least treatable 
within the life-span of the affected;
– Strict avoidance of any further damage;
– Care for all affected in the philosophi-
cal sense of “justice”;
– Professional ethics like pledge of 
secrecy in the case of medical doctors, 
therapists and priests.
But even this far more complex approach 
does not withstand critique. The “second 
order principles” mentioned above remain 
vague and indeterminate. The so-called 
“first order principles” are by no means 
neutral phenomena, the existence of which 
could be proven with means of clinical 
purity. The only way of taking account of 
social phenomena is by means of commu-
nication. The person who is entangled in 
ethical dilemmas and the bioethicist who is 
theoretically interested in ethical problems 
do have to talk to each other. This is the 
first and most essential relation, which the 
two parties have to enter. We have to keep 
in our mind, however, that the project of 
a narrative bioethics is not in competition 
with traditional forms of ethical justifica-
tion. The necessity of an alternative ethical 
concept results from the blind spots of an 
ethics based on principles alone.
One can assume that members of former 
generations have made similar experiences. 
But the sociologist contradicts this widely 
held belief forcefully. We sociologists hold 
onto the conviction that the narrability of 
suffering has emerged in history. Physical 
pain in all its dimensions is a product of 
that kind of modernization, which we soci-
ologists call “individualization.” In this new 
sociological discourse “individualization” 
means the breaking away of existential rail-
ings, the dissolution of traditional, mostly 
religiously shaped patterns of life, which 
used to protect us from despair and give us 
hope and consolation. In contrast to other 
areas of life, love, and erotic pleasure, where 
the existential balance sheet is definitely 
positive, the balance in the case of illness, 
solitude and fear of death is clearly negative. 
The culturally shaped coping strategies with 
death, dying, and illness are melting away.
So the necessity came into the modern 
world to be able of making sense of one’s 
own life, in particular when leaving or 
entering the stage of life. We are, as it was 
wonderfully put by Katrin Bentele, exposed 
to the contingencies of life without any 
protection.
Crises in the sense of breakdown of col-
lective or individual identities are managed 
with similar means. My identity has to be 
protected against external threats of its 
integrity by means of increased “reflexive 
efforts.” “Reflexive efforts” basically mean 
telling stories – stories which are told and 
retold on different levels and contexts – this 
means the stories of the nation’s history, 
its triumphs, its guilts, the stories of the 
family, the stories which parents tell their 
children when putting them to bed. These 
stories demonstrate that human beings have 
identity not as an immutable possession. 
But more as a provisional result of perma-
nent reflexive efforts, which last as long as 
our lives.
Helmut Plessner, a German philoso-
pher born in the early twentieth century, 
introduced the famous distinction between 
“having a body” and “being in a body.” 
This distinction corresponds to the older 
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relaxed manner. It was a good life, if the per-
son can feel like an author, who has inscribed 
traces in the texture of civil society, which 
cannot be overlooked and will be remem-
bered. A life has gained significance beyond 
its mere zoological dimension when it can 
be told as a story. The collective life of a civil 
society is a texture of told and yet untold 
stories, a mosaic of biographies. Biography 
is a strange genre, because its constitutive 
features – the beginning and the end of a 
life – are concealed to the respective person. 
The preconditions and consequences of all 
the important decisions in life are too com-
plex for the individuals involved to be fully 
aware of them. On the contrary, one of the 
prerequisites for happiness is realizing life’s 
open-endedness and having an inkling that 
beyond the next mountain range, around the 
next bend in the road, lies an unknown land.
RefeRences
Bentele, K. (2007). Ethische Aspekte der Regenerativen 
Medizin. Das Beispiel Morbus Parkinson. Berlin: LIT 
Verlag
Dubiel, H. (2009). Deep Within the Brain: Living with 
Parkinson’s Disease. New York: Europa editions.
Plessner, H. (1928). Die Stufen des Organischen und der 
Mensch. Einleitung in die Philosophische Anthropologie. 
Berlin: de Gruyter.
Received: 07 January 2011; accepted: 18 April 2011; pub-
lished online: 04 May 2011.
Citation: Dubiel H (2011) What is “narrative bioethics” 
Front. Integr. Neurosci. 5:10. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2011.00010
Copyright © 2011 Dubiel. This is an open-access article 
subject to a non-exclusive license between the authors and 
Frontiers Media SA, which permits use, distribution and 
reproduction in other forums, provided the original authors 
and source are credited and other Frontiers conditions are 
complied with.
chance which remains for the sick person 
consists in keeping aware of this rupture, 
as long as he or she is able to. This may be 
the only way to recover in a deep existen-
tial sense in regaining the existential sov-
ereignty, which he or she has lost with the 
experience of his or her vulnerability. In our 
times a sick person is compelled to make 
one’s own sense of his life and his mortality. 
This ability of making one’s own sense on 
birth and death is necessary, because being 
born and dying is due to the successes of 
biotechnology, no more a simple act which 
is accepted by its mere suddenness. Since 
entering and leaving the stage of life has 
become a process which is stretched and 
compressed in a peculiar way, because 
pregnancy and parenthood are discoupled 
and the former status of the dead person is 
differentiated in person in a coma, persons 
partially in coma, and persons with no vital 
signs of the heart or the brain. Thus life and 
death have developed not only into an ethi-
cal, but also in a political question.
I can think, talk, and formulate thoughts 
as I speak just like before. In the recent past 
I have tried – with some success – to secure 
the positive stocks of my life rather than 
lament what I am no longer able to have or 
to do. Thus, I have begun to reconcile myself 
with my pacemaker. It gives me energy and 
mobility. I can accept it now because I more 
often take the liberty of turning it off. Then 
I feel as if nothing has ever happened before.
Coming to the end, only that person, who 
has lived a good life, will be able to stand the 
outlook of imminent death in a calm and 
German distinction of Körper and Leib 
(Plessner, 1928). The difference between 
“having a body” (Körper) and “being in 
a body” (Leib) can be illustrated with the 
way with which infants experience their 
body. Experiencing the body in the sense of 
Leiberfahrung (physical experience) forms 
the basis of personal identity.
The reflection of people in distress pre-
figures the line along which the experience 
of physical suffering can become the raw 
material of bioethical reflection. I call this 
constellation of pain and identity paradoxi-
cal, because it is just the medical intervention 
into the integrity of our body which directs 
our attention to this complex constellation.
The body is checked, measured, and 
evaluated by the medical profession. It 
is evident that these interventions affect 
persons differently; the doctors are inter-
ested in the body only as mechanic system, 
whereas the patient can take this role only 
for a short time.
I am neither a philosopher nor a theo-
logian, but only a sociologist, an expert 
only for the penultimate matters. But even 
people like me can be aware of the fact that 
each of us entered one stage of life and will 
leave it on another. Now, finally, we have 
found the close link between our capacity 
to reflect on our bodies in distress and the 
capacity to talk, to tell, and listen to sto-
ries. “Hermeneutics” as the art of reading 
texts paradoxically starts to work in view of 
ruptures in the text, which block its under-
standing. Experiencing a severe disease is 
a similar rupture in the lifecycle. The only 
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 10 | 2
Dubiel What is “narrative bioethics”
